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In virtual worlds, where 20 million people spend $200 million
each year,' rules of life are governed by contract, 2 and three-party
transactions are ubiquitous; every exchange of virtual cash, property,
sound, pictures, and even conversation introduces a third party into
the contractual relationship between user and virtual-world provider.3
Whenever a contract affects a non-party, the third-party beneficiary
(TPB) doctrine might apply. To date, however, the practical and
theoretical boundaries of this important doctrine's application to
virtual worlds have yet to be fully explored,4 perhaps because of an
overly narrow doctrinal conception.5
Many states have loosened TPB requirements somewhat,6 with
most having adopted an approach similar to that of the Second
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1. Mike Musgrove, Virtual Games Create a Real World Market, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
2005, at AO1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/16/AR2005091602083.html. These numbers are surely higher
today.
2. But see Joshua Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual Governance of
Online Communities 3 (Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 89, July 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1002997 (arguing that contracts alone cannot govern virtual worlds).
3. Joshua Fairfield provides a helpful graphic depicting the complexity of contractual
and other relationships in virtual worlds. Joshua Fairfield, Electronic Contract, Virtual Property,
and the God Paradox 6-8, http://www.hans-bredow-institut.de/webfm send/86 (last visited Oct.
13, 2008).
4. Dan E. Lawrence, It Really Is Just a Game. The Impracticability of Common Law
Property Rights in Virtual Property, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 505, 530-32 (2008) (discussing the
theory briefly).
5. See Fairfield, supra note 2, at 57 ("Third-party beneficiary law does not help: that law
has always required that the beneficiary be named, and thus specific, at the time of the creation
of the contract.").
6. Jennifer Sapp, Note, Aging Out of Foster Care: Enforcing the Independent Living
Program Through Contract Liability, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2861, 2891 (2008) ("In most
jurisdictions, the intent of the parties may be proven by the surrounding circumstances rather
than by relying on the express language of the contract.").
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Restatement of Contracts, which looks at the totality of circumstances
to determine whether a third party can enforce the terms of a
contract.7 As a result, TPB rights are judicially cognizable claims that
will impact virtual world contracting 8 and interacting. Though its
application is not universal, TPB enforcement envisioned by the
Restatement is an important, and in some cases the only, way to
vindicate user rights in the hub and spoke contractual relationships
between a virtual world provider and its many users.
This essay introduces the TPB concept to virtual worlds in three
ways. First, it describes how third-party interactions permeate virtual
worlds. Second, it provides a general framework for applying the TPB
doctrine to virtual world user agreements. Third, it applies that
framework to particular recurring problems that virtual world users
face.
I. THIRD PARTIES IN VIRTUAL WORLDS
Virtual world providers enter into a contract with each user.
9
These user agreements establish rules of conduct for the user's
interaction with the provider and the user's interaction with other
users. Both types of interactions offer potential benefits to third
parties, namely other users. Many virtual wrongs that are not real-
world torts nonetheless might violate the "virtual law" rules of
conduct enforceable only in contract.1° In the absence of a directly
actionable crime, tort, or contract," all that remains are benefits
bestowed by user agreements. Thus, the contract to be enforced in
three-party interactions is the real-world contract between a user and
the provider. Where the provider does not enforce the contract against
a breaching user, it falls to third-party users who have been harmed to
attempt to enforce the breaching user's agreement with the provider-a
contract to which the harmed user is not a party due to the hub and
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
8. This is not to imply that a contract is necessarily the best solution. As others have
argued, there are problems with contractual property systems. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 773, 776-77 (2001). However, so
long as contracts govern virtual worlds, contract doctrine will be relevant. Eric Goldman,
Speech Showdowns at the Virtual Corral, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 845,
846 (2005) (arguing that virtual worlds are no different than any other online environment, and
that standard rules should apply to them).
9. This analysis assumes that the terms of service are a binding contract.
10. For example, morally wrong or socially unacceptable virtual harassment, spam, theft,
and murder may not be real-world crimes or torts.
11. There may well be virtual or real-world contracts between users; those contracts
would be directly enforceable by the aggrieved user.
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spoke nature of multiple separate user agreements with a single
provider.
For example, in Hernandez v. Internet Gaming Entertainment,
LTD., 12 the class-action plaintiff, a user of Blizzard Entertainment's
World of Warcraft (WoW), sued another WoW user, Internet Gaming
Entertainment (IGE), for breach of IGE's agreement with Blizzard.'
3
IGE is in the business of buying and selling currency, items, and
accounts in virtual worlds, 14 and allegedly sells WoW gold that it
"farms" using low-cost independent contractors.' 5 Hernandez claims
that IGE's farming and sale of virtual gold for real money breaches
the Blizzard terms of service, 16 and Blizzard has failed to take action
against the breach. This breach allegedly depleted available virtual
gold and devalued virtual currency for third-party users, causing real
world loss of use of the system, lost time spent prospecting virtual
resources, and computer speed degradation.'
7
Another example is the "No Control Provision" of the Linden
Lab Second Life agreement, which states that users can interact with
the environment and Linden Lab generally will not regulate those
interactions.' 8  While this section's primary purpose is to limit
provider liability for users' untoward actions, it also creates a set of
12. Amended Class Action Complaint, Hemandez v. Internet Gaming Entm't, LTD., No.
07-21403-Civ-COHN/SNOW (S.D. Fl., filed Aug. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Amended Complaint],
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/florida/flsdce/1:2007cv21403/296927/5/.
13. Id. at 1-2.
14. Ige.com, Our Business, http://www.ige.com/about (last visited Dec. 30, 2008).
15. Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at 1-2. Gold farming is a term of art that
describes the generation of gold and other valuable objects for sale through the use of cheap
labor. Dave Rosenberg, 'Gold Farming' Good for Multiplayer Games?, CNet News NEGATIVE
APPROACH, Oct. 2, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13846_3-10056262-62.html. Thus, IGE is
technically not a user-its employees and contractors would actually click the "agree" button to
become users.
16. World of Warcraft Terms of Use § 11,
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2008)
("Accordingly, you may not sell items for 'real' money or otherwise exchange items for value
outside of the Game.").
17. Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at 9-13.
18. Second Life Terms of Service § 1.2, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last
visited Dec. 29, 2008) ("1.2 Linden Lab is a service provider, which means, among other things,
that Linden Lab does not control various aspects of the Service. You acknowledge that Linden
Lab is a service provider that may allow people to interact online regarding topics and content
chosen by users of the service, and that users can alter the service environment on a real-time
basis. Linden Lab generally does not regulate the content of communications between users or
users' interactions with the Service. As a result, Linden Lab has very limited control, if any,
over the quality, safety, morality, legality, truthfulness or accuracy of various aspects of the
Service.").
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beneficiaries, whether intended or unintended.' 9 In essence, Linden
Lab is agreeing that the virtual world will not be regulated except as
set forth in the agreement. Any third party interacting with a user is a
beneficiary of that lack of regulation.
For example, a Second Life user called Performer might want to
perform a juggling show. Performer would advertise the show, either
online or offline. If it looks sufficiently entertaining, user Audience
might pay virtual money-which, unlike in WoW, costs Audience real
money. If Linden Lab decides to terminate the show in breach of its
agreement with Performer, then Audience-who has paid for a show
that never occurred-would be a non-contracting beneficiary of the No
Control Provision.
Pervasive third-party benefits are not surprising; providers want
to take little or no responsibility for interactions between their users
so long as users do not leave in droves. For example, if User A
engages in offensive behavior, a provider would want User B to
pursue a remedy with User A rather than the provider. Thus, much of
the user activity under a provider's agreement would be for the
benefit of the users, whether directly or indirectly.
II. WHAT RIGHTS Do AND SHOULD THIRD PARTIES HAVE?
Receipt of benefits by the third party does not end the inquiry;
the TPB doctrine only protects non-parties who are intended to
benefit from the contract .2  Only then may a third party sue for a
contractual breach despite not being a party to the agreement. 2' The
"intention" threshold for such an extra-contractual action is strict; the
contracting parties must intentionally bestow something of value, an
affirmative benefit, or even a savings, on the third party.22 The third
19. As discussed below, this does not mean that the third party has legal rights.
20. SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 37:8 (4th ed. 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 315 (1981); R. T. Kimbrough,
Right of Third Person to Enforce Contract Between Others for His Benefit, 81 A.L.R. 1271,
1286 (1932) ("It is often stated by the courts that the contract must have been intended for the
benefit of the third person, in order to entitle him to enforce the same.").
21. To be sure, third-party users will be separately subject to the same agreement with the
provider, but the question here is what User B's rights are when User A and the provider have a
contractual dispute.
22. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 20, at § 37:7 ("For example, in a case involving an
agreement between a divorcing husband and wife, the husband promised to pay his wife's
attorney's fees resulting from the divorce proceedings, and the court held that the agreement
amounted to a third party creditor beneficiary contract for the benefit of the attorney.").
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party cannot be a remote or an "incidental" beneficiary. 3 For
example, a neighbor who might enjoy looking at a nice lawn is not an
intended beneficiary of the contract between the homeowner and the
landscaper. However, if the threshold is surpassed, then the TPB can
sue the breaching party even if the other contracting party will not.24
The difficult task is determining which beneficiaries are intended
and which are merely incidental. The analysis is complicated and
quite important where a user has paid for an un-received service or is
divested of virtual property caused by someone else's breach of an
unrelated contract.
For example, the Hernandez v. IGE complaint summarily alleges
25intent. The provider requires that each user agrees not to cheat,
intuitively so as to benefit other users. To be sure, Blizzard benefits as
well because it cannot attract and retain users if the users are unhappy
from being continuously cheated by others, but this only reinforces
the intuition that user happiness was an intended benefit of the
Blizzard-IGE contract.
However, this intuitive argument is limited. What if Blizzard
desires certain cheating activity (despite the contract) and does not
really want other users to be able to stop a cheater? The intent to
benefit others 'nay be lacking. Also, extending the Second Life
hypothetical, what if Linden Lab terminates not only the juggling
show, but Performer's account, which leads to the termination of the
show? Intuitively, Audience and every other user who might see the
show is a beneficiary of Performer's right to exist in Second Life, but
they seem more like neighbors enjoying a nice lawn. These two
examples illustrate the limits of intuition.
When intuition fails, what should determine intention? Many
cases involving service agreements provide little guidance. These
cases are contradictory,26 and most litigated contracts are not
23. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 315 (1981); Kimbrough, supra note
20, at 1287 ("It follows from the foregoing that a mere incidental or consequential benefit which
might accrue to a third person by reason of the performance of the contract is not sufficient to
enable him to maintain an action on the contract").
24. The classic TPB example is the named beneficiary of an insurance policy.
25. Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at 18.
26. See, e.g., Locke v. Ozark City Bd. of Educ., 910 So. 2d 1247 (Ala. 2005) (a league
contract mandating police protection at games was intended to benefit umpires of those games);
Stewart ex rel. Womack v. City of Jackson, 804 So. 2d 1041, 1050 (Miss. 2002) (bus passenger
was a beneficiary of a contract between city and bus operator); Bush v. Upper Valley Telecable
Co., 524 P.2d 1055 (Idaho 1973) (customer was a TPB of a contract between city and cable
franchisee with respect to fees charged by franchisee); New York Citizens Comm. on Cable TV
v. Manhattan Cable TV, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 802, 815-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (customer is TPB of
2009]
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analogous to "virtual law" agreements because most service
agreements do not contemplate interaction between users.
However, the broad definition of intended beneficiaries in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides a starting point, finding
intention if a totality of circumstances shows that the promisee
intended to confer a benefit on another.27 Intent is construed
objectively rather than subjectively, 28 and the third party's reasonable
reliance on the contract is relevant.29 The appeal of an objective
analysis is that intent may be found even if the provider and the user
have no subjective desire to enforce the contractual terms;30 thus, TPB
rights may be the only way to enforce what would otherwise be empty
promises.
Trade associations provide a good hub and spoke analogy-each
member has an agreement with the association, but not with each
other. The question becomes which terms are actionable by one
member against another and which terms are not. Judge Posner
provided useful analysis in MacGregor v. Rutberg,3 1 a case where one
doctor sued another for a violation of rules imposed by a professional
association to which each doctor belonged.32 Such a violation was not
contract between city and cable franchisee with respect to franchisee's refusal to carry
unaffiliated cable channels); but see, e.g., CDP Event Servs., Inc. v. Atcheson, 656 S.E.2d 537,
539 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (concert patrons not TPB's of contract between security company and
concert venue: "But the fact that performance of the contract might benefit Atcheson does not
alone establish the requisite intent. Instead, the contract must show the parties' clear intent to
confer a benefit on Atcheson and other patrons of the Amphitheatre, as '[a] third-party
beneficiary must be the intended beneficiary of the contract; the mere fact that a third party
would benefit incidentally from the performance of the contract is not alone sufficient to give
such person standing to sue on the contract.(citations omitted, emphasis in original); Joseph v.
Hospital Dist. No. 2, 939 So.2d 1206, 1213-14 (La. 2006) (doctor members of association are
not TPB's of contract between hospital and association because no direct benefit flowed to
doctors from hospital).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(b) (1981) (Beneficiary is intended "if
recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention
of the parties and.., the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary
the benefit of the promised performance.").
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 reporter's note (1981) ("The new
language in the preamble of Subsection (1) takes account of factors not dependent on intention
as stated in Comment d"); WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 20, at 37:8 n. 11.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. d (1981) (In examples of
intended beneficiaries, "if the beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on the promise as
manifesting an intention to confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary.").
30. Fairfield, supra note 2, at 4-5 (pointing out that contracts fail when companies do not
enforce the agreements).
31. MacGregor v. Rutberg, 478 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007).
32. Id. at 791, 793-95.
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actionable under the TPB doctrine, but a requirement that two
members arbitrate disputes would be actionable:
The rule [requiring arbitration] would be for the direct benefit of
the disputants and not the rest of the membership, and so they
would be the logical enforcers of it. This is not true with regard to
the rule governing expert testimony by members. Its logical
enforcer is the association's management and the logical remedy if
it determines that there has been a violation is to expel the
violator.
33
This analysis tracks the requirement of the Restatement:
consideration of the objective benefits to parties as well as the likely
remedies based on reliance on the contract with the central party.
34
However, not all jurisdictions will apply a broad reading of the
Restatement in every case.3 5  For example, in Register.com, Inc. v.
36Verio, Inc., a domain name registrar (Register.com) entered into an
agreement with its governing body (ICANN) mandating that
Register.com not limit other registrars' use of its public customer
database.37 Despite finding that the agreement conferred a benefit on
the other registrars, the court ruled that they were not third-party
beneficiaries of the agreement because the agreement provided a
specific grievance procedure for ICANN to determine whether the
contract had been breached.38 The refusal to find an intentional
benefit in this case is still arguably within the ambit of the
Restatement. The court looked at all of the circumstances to
determine whether the parties objectively intended to confer a benefit
on other registrars, and found that the intention was that a grievance
procedure should be used rather than a breach of contract action.
33. Id. at 794-95 (citations omitted). Accord Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F.
Supp. 2d 585, 597-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (no enforcement of arbitration agreement as TPB where
party had no connection with agreement at issue).
34. See also Hall v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 985 F. Supp. 782, 796-97 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (holding that a college football player had a likelihood of proving that student athletes
were TPBs of a contract between NCAA and member schools where the issue is eligibility,
something determined by NCAA contract).
35. See Fairfield, supra note 2, at 57. However, most states are not as strict as Professor
Fairfield implies. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 20, § 37:8 (providing example cases from
several states that do not require explicit contractual TPB clauses and instead look only to
objective intent and circumstances. Further, even those states that are strict will be more likely
to accept the Restatement than, say, to declare virtual property real property.).
36. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
37. Id. at 395-96.
38. Id. at 399-400.
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11. APPLICATION TO VIRTUAL WORLDS
The Restatement definition provides guidance about how courts
might handle several types of virtual world disputes. Five contractual
provisions that might lead to such disputes are anti-cheating clauses,
property ownership clauses, legal compliance clauses, anti-
harassment clauses, and identification clauses.
A. Anti-Cheating Clauses
Determining whether third-party users are intended beneficiaries
of anti-cheating provisions depends on the type of cheating and the
harm caused. For example, a Second Life user might improperly
create "Linden Bucks," the virtual money in Second Life.39 Linden
Lab charges users real money for Linden Bucks, so "counterfeiting"
in violation of the contract would directly deprive Linden Lab of
income. Other users, whose primary harm would be inflated virtual
prices due to a larger virtual money supply, would not be intended
beneficiaries because Linden Lab stands to lose the most by such
conduct. In Hernandez, however, where WoW gold cannot be
purchased, cheating deprives other users of potentially limited
resources in addition to devaluing their currency.40 Thus, other WoW
users objectively benefit from the anti-cheating provision because
more gold and other resources are available to them.
B. Ownership Clauses
The intent of clauses that grant ownership of property4l to users
can also vary. Certainly such clauses are intended to benefit the initial
owner, but can they really be said to intentionally benefit third-party
users, such as potential buyers?
For example, a user could acquire property and then sell the
property to a third party for real money. If the provider divests the
buyer of ownership-either wrongly in breach of its agreement to grant
ownership to the seller or rightly because the seller breached its
39. See Second Life Terms of Service, supra note 18, § 4.2 ("You agree not to create or
provide any server emulators or other software or other means that provide access to or use of
the Servers without the express written authorization of Linden Lab.").
40. Amended Complaint, supra note 12, at 8-10. WoW could solve this by "planting"
more gold, but such acts may not be contractually required, nor would it be terribly helpful-it
would simply cause hyper-inflation just as if a real government simply printed more and more
currency.
41. Property could be real intellectual property (an uploaded song) or virtual (gold or
land). See JOSEPH WILLIAM. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES § 15.1
(3d ed. 2002); see also Fairfield, supra note 2, at 14.
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agreement with the provider by cheating to obtain the property-then
the third-party buyer would want to sue either the provider or the
seller for the breach that caused the loss. The buyer would have no
direct contractual recourse against the deep-pocketed provider, nor
could it obtain the property from the seller even if it could recover its
42purchase price. Indeed, the buyer might not even have direct
recourse against the seller for breach of contract if the seller did not
realize it had breached (no fraud) and also delivered the property as
promised (no breach of contract).
43
Despite this potential harm to third parties, however, ownership
clauses do not generally create intended beneficiaries. The primary
reliance on such a clause would be by the contracting party (the
owner of the property) and not potential buyers. Otherwise, every
purchasing contract could be construed to create intended
beneficiaries for all potential downstream buyers, which has never
been the law. 4
There is one important scenario where intended beneficiaries
might be created-where the provider revokes all rights to either own
or trade property in the world. In such a case, third-party users could
argue that the entire system of property trading was intended to
benefit them.
C. Legal Compliance Clauses
Clauses that require users to obey real-world laws ("no fraud")
and virtual-world laws ("be polite") are complex from a third-party
perspective. These clauses are non-targeted and the promise does not
necessarily benefit other users. Also, real-world unlawfulness would
likely be actionable independently, such that breach of contract would
be superfluous.
When read in conjunction with "no control" provisions,
however, such clauses objectively benefit other users. Lawfulness
covenants are essentially agreements to follow "virtual law." If the
42. For example, if one buys a car that the bank is about to repossess (rightly or wrongly)
from the seller, one cannot sue the bank for a direct breach of contract, and suing the seller for
specific performance would be no use-the bank holds the car.
43. This is a situation in which an implied covenant to deliver "clean title" to virtual
property might be helpful.
44. For example, one is not an intended beneficiary of the loan contract between the car
seller and the bank, even if one incidentally benefits from the seller's use of loan proceeds to
buy the car to sell to that individual. Cf Varwig v. Anderson-Behel Porsche/Audi, Inc., 74 Cal.
App. 3d 578, 580-81 (1977) (holding that the seller of an automobile without clear title was only
liable for fraud on downstream third-party purchasers where seller knew that car was intended
for resale).
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provider makes clear in the contract that it will not intervene to
enforce that law, then no one is left to enforce the contract except
other users. If other users could not enforce contractual requirements
to behave lawfully, such rules would essentially be written out of the
contract. Therefore, other users are necessarily intended beneficiaries
of lawfulness provisions; users are entitled to a civil action 45 for
unlawful acts that do harm, just as they would be in real-space, where
it is the government and not a contract that imposes the law.
Noah v. AOL Time-Warner, Inc.46 accentuates the importance of
finding intentional beneficiaries for user misconduct. Noah sued AOL
for the allegedly harassing conduct of another user that violated
AOL's user agreement with that user.47 AOL was immune from direct
liability under the Communications Decency Act,4 8 leaving only a
contract claim against AOL for failure to enforce its user agreement.
The court found that AOL had no duty to enforce its agreement. The
contract was quite clear that AOL had discretion to enforce any user's
breach of its rules.49 Noah attempted to claim TPB status as to AOL,
but the court ruled that "AOL no more owes a duty to other AOL
members to enforce its Community Guidelines than it does with
respect to plaintiff."5 °
Cases like Noah show that user agreements which do not require
provider enforcement-and no strategically written user agreement
does so-render conduct rules in such agreements illusory, practically,
if not legally. The only currently available means for enforcement,
therefore, is for the aggrieved user to be considered a TPB of such
provisions, especially where, unlike the Register.com case, there is no
enforcement and no grievance policy with the provider. Had Noah
sued the other user rather than AOL, he might have had more success
on a TPB breach of contract claim.
45. Injured users would have a contract claim for virtual wrongs to correspond to acts that
might give rise to tort claims if they occurred in real-space.
46. Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 545-46 (E.D. Va. 2003).
47. Id. at 534.
48. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
49. Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 545.
50. Id. at 545-46.
51. Of course, the other user may be more difficult to locate, and almost certainly would
not have the assets of AOL Time Warner. These difficulties, however, do not mean that AOL
should be liable for failure to enforce a contract that explicitly states that enforcement is not
contractually required.
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D. Anti-Spam and Anti-Harassment Clauses
As an extension of general compliance rules, users targeted for
spam or harassment specifically should be considered intended
beneficiaries of any contract barring such activity. Subjectively,
intentional harassers, commonly called "griefers, ' 52  nominally
"agree" to such provisions in order to gain virtual world access but
actually intend to harm other users in breach of such provisions.
Objectively, though, a promise not to harass other users must be
construed as an intention to benefit those users. The practical effect is
that users who are targets of harassment or spain can directly sue
other users for harassment that is contractually, but not otherwise
legally, objectionable.
E. Identification Clauses
Clauses that require users to disclose their real identities do not
create intended beneficiaries. Real identities are usually hidden from
users, so there can be no intent to benefit others. However,
agreements not to impersonate other users do create intended
beneficiaries; those who are impersonated rely on others' agreements
not to do so. Thus, one could sue an impersonator for breach of the
impersonator's agreement with the provider as a TPB.
IV. CONCLUSION
The third-party beneficiary doctrine has the potential to allow
participants to vindicate rights that might otherwise be ignored by the
contracting parties. Full recourse requires a broad reading of intended
beneficiary status under the Second Restatement, but states are
moving in this direction. Because no new "law" is required, courts
will entertain third-party beneficiary claims before they consider more
exotic virtual-world theories.53
52. Electronic Arts, Customer Support, What do you consider "grief tactics," anyway?,
http://tinyurl.com/4y9w6h (last visited Dec. 30, 2008) (referring to "grief players" and their
tactics).
53. Such enforcement may provide fertile foundation for courts to adopt
recommendations of more provocative virtual-world analyses. Even the gaps in enforcement,
such as with ownership clauses, may encourage new treatment of virtual worlds. See, e.g.,
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1094 (2005) (arguing that virtual
property should be treated like real property); Steven J. Horowitz, Note, Competing Lockean
Claims to Virtual Property, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 443, 446-47 (2007).
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